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Ines Ciolli
The new challenges  
of constitutional Courts: global 
markets, terrorism and immigration
The Italian case
Global world provided new challenges for constitutional courts. The first one is about the 
inclusion of constitutional judges in political decisions because they are called to supply or 
sometimes to replace parliaments, which are enables to make unpopular choices. «Excep-
tionality» and «promptness» are two new and challenging developments that Constitutions 
have to face when entering the global world. The challenge for the Constitutional Courts is 
an insidious and unnatural one: they were born to govern, with certain and predictable rules, 
moments that are at times exceptional: the relationship with continuous exceptionality and 
emergency shines the spotlight on their inadequacy. Moreover, there is also a continuous 
and palpable tension between Constitutions – which are designed to last, theoretically, for all 
eternity so as to be immortal and in force indefinitely – and the precarious nature of the fast 
time frames and contracts now demanded of state institutions in order to regulate increasingly 
fleeting and fluid current phenomena.
Keywords: Constitutional courts, immigration, terrorism, economic crisis, global challenge.
1. The economic crisis and the Italian democracy
Over the past decade, the Italian constitutional system has been impacted 
by considerable economic and financial crisis, associated with a deeper 
political one, due mainly to the crisis of representation in Parliament. 
Many and varied in nature, the causes of this political crisis include a 
malfunctioning representation model now unable to express the different 
values and principles existing in a pluralistic society.
In fact, the Italian Parliament suffers from an inability to produce 
a satisfactory form of mediation of different needs in so fragmented a 
society1. It is unclear whether this is a classic crisis of representation or, 
1 Many authors have analysed the crisis of political representation, which is the first of the 
problems facing contemporary Parliaments and the crisis of democracy. The relationship be-
tween representation, political parties and pluralism has been examined by C. Crouch, Post-De-
mocracy, Polity Press, 2004; C. Offe, Crisis and Innovation of Liberal Democracy: Can Deliberation 
Be Institutionalised?, in Czech Sociological Review, 47, 2011, 447-472 and M. Luciani, Unità na-
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rather, a crisis of the «represented» – that is, a crisis of identity relating to 
common democratic and social values that can no longer be easily traced 
after the collapse of nation states, and above all after the rise of global 
economic (and perhaps) political systems breaking up all political unity.
This Constitutional crisis has impacted all modern democracies called 
upon to respond quickly to technological and scientific evolution and to 
the consequently hasty and rapid change in human conditions2. For this 
reason, managing new conflicts upsetting political societies throughout 
the world is particularly strenuous, and not only for Italy. As Bruce Ack-
ermann asserts in his «diagnosis» of the diseases of contemporary democ-
racies, these democracies are under continuous attack. The roots of the 
most recent dysfunctions can be found in a «change in the relationship of 
the State, the market and technologies of the destruction»3 – and with the 
latter term he meant terrorism. I am not sure we ought to speak of «dis-
eases»; democracy is able to accept the challenge of its transformation, 
because, as Italian philosopher Alessandro Ferrara argues, the essence 
of this form of government is to be «open»4. In the current democratic 
government, he traces three challenges to be overcome: a new reading of 
the principle of separation of powers; an expansion of deliberative democ-
racy; and control over emergency through democratic categories5. In my 
opinion, one may also add control over pluralism that must not become 
hyper-pluralism, which plays against unity of the State, and against the 
persistence of democratic models.
These are the new challenges to which European democracies, too, 
are called upon to respond: a new juridical world, partly globalized and 
partly still tied to national States, that must renew its categories with-
zionale e struttura economica. La prospettiva della Costituzione repubblicana, in Diritto e Società, 
2011, 636-719. For an overview of the issues related to today’s crisis, C. Drigo, Interpretation 
and Use of Principles in Constitutional Reasoning. Some Remarks on the Challenges Stemming from 
the Recent Italian «Constitutional Case Law of Crisis», in Federalismi.it, 2017, 6 and M. Renner, 
Death of complexity. The Financial Crisis and the Crisis of Law in the World Society, in P.F. Kjaer, 
G. Teubner, A. Febbrajo (eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of 
Functional Differentiation, London, 2011, 93-112.
2 We are witnessing the deepest and most intense transformation of contemporary democra-
cies, as argued by P. Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée, Paris, 2000, 426-434, where sover-
eignty, viewed as the expression of a collective will, no longer exists. There remain the «two 
illusions» of a restoration of the collective will through nationalism and strict control of the 
boundaries. or through the management of globalization.
3 B. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, Yale, 2006, 14.
4 A. Ferrara, Democrazia e apertura, Bruno Mondadori, 2011, especially 47 ff., where the author 
illustrates democracy’s passion for openness, consisting of an open attitude towards the new.
5 Ivi, 84 ff.
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out betraying the primacy of democracy and, above all, of its Constitu-
tions. Terrorism, financial crisis and migration rules have put European 
Constitutions to the test as they try to bypass the democratic principles 
contained therein; but these principles seem to be maintained in all Con-
stitutional charters thanks to the role of the guardians of the Constitutions 
played both by Parliaments and by Constitutional courts in each country 
to a different extent.
Italy’s particular situation is marked by chronic political and financial 
issues dating back to earlier periods of the most recent crisis: a historically 
lacking sense of unity has made our country unable to produce common 
values and shared political choices; this in turn is the cause and effect of 
a polarized system of political parties6; the result is a weak Parliament 
and a non-cohesive parliamentary majority, so neither Parliament nor the 
Government has the strength or authority to impose long-term vision, but 
are exposed to populism and hasty decisions. This is especially evident in 
migration.
The lack of long-term political programs is also one of the reasons 
leading to a high degree of indebtedness: such a system makes it possible 
only to squander resources in myriad ways; real investments for the long 
term, aimed at improving the overall quality of life of society as a whole, 
cannot be made7.
One of the most important Constitutional transformations focuses 
on the economic and financial crises8 that have impacted and transformed 
several Italian institutions: the national Parliament’s legislative power and 
its control over financial deliberations is called into question9; the Govern-
ment has increased its exceptional regulatory power, because of what is 
mistakenly considered a period of economic emergency and not a perma-
6 M. Luciani, Costituzione, istituzioni e processi di costruzione dell’unità nazionale, in Rivista AIC, 
2, 2011, 1-16.
7 P. Ignazi, Power and the (Il)legitimacy of Political Parties: An Unavoidable Paradox of Contempo-
rary Democracy?, in Party Politics, 20, 2014, 160–169.
8 For a broad comparison on crisis in the European countries, see X. Contiades X., (Ed.), Con-
stitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis, London, 2013, 1. For an analysis 
of the relationship with political globalization and the Constitutional crisis, see I. Ciolli, The 
Constitutional Consequences of Financial Crisis and the Use of Emergency Powers: Flexibility and 
Emergency Sources, in Rivista AIC, 1, 2015, 1-22.
9 C. Fasone, National Parliaments in the Eurozone Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, in Toruskie 
Studia Polsko-Woskie, 11, 2015, 7-27, which analyses some transformations taking place in par-
liamentary decisions, such as those on transparency, on relationships in the bicameral system, 
and on the scrutiny of the Chamber in executive power in light of the new budget procedures; 
see also K. Tuori, K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge, 2014, 194-
206 as regards the loss of autonomy of national parliaments in budget procedures.
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nent transformation10. We are also witnessing a «presidentialization» of 
politics and of executive power11 that a fragmented parliamentary majority 
encourages because a decision-making by a single leader can help avoid 
long and often unsuccessful bargaining in Parliament or even within the 
executive; although not very democratic, the leader’s resolution comes 
quickly and, above all, there is certainty as to the amount of time that will 
be needed – an important element when having to follow (sudden) mar-
ket trends. This also explains the real abuse of the emergency rules by the 
Government during the economic crisis12.
A whole transformation going to the Constitution’s very core13 also 
involved the Constitutional Court, called upon to interpret the text of the 
Constitution in light of the new situation.
The Constitutional judges’ role in economic fields has changed and 
is at times transfigured: sometimes the Constitutional Court replaces the 
Court of Auditors and becomes an accounting judge14; at other times – 
and of far greater concern – it replaces Parliament in its role as political 
negotiator. In these cases, its decisions involve a high level of discretion, 
because it is called upon in the absence of the Parliamentary assembly. 
The court balances the rights contained in the Constitution with one 
another and with other fundamental principles, and does not always 
10 G. Agamben, Stato di eccezione, Milano, 2003, 3 speaks about a «permanent» state of excep-
tion; B. Ackermann, The Emergency Constitution, in 113 The Yale Law Journal, (2004), 1029-1091. 
recalled that the emergency should not endanger the fundamental principles of democratic 
order and should instead be constitutionally provided for and disavowed.
11 Th. Poguntke, Th. P. Webb, The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies, Oxford, 2007, 1 ff. which takes into consideration different forms of concentration 
of power – even in parliamentary regimes – which consists not only of a polarization of the 
decision in the Executive power, but precisely of a progressive form of concentration of power 
around a leader in a democratic political system.
12 This is well explained in R. Calvano (ed.), «Legislazione governativa d’urgenza» e crisi, Napoli, 
2015, 1-24, which casts light on the marginalization of parliamentary debate, 6 ff., G. Rivosec-
chi, Decretazione d’urgenza e governo dell’economia, in R. Calvano (Ed.), op. cit., 119-154, which 
speaks of the «twisting imposed on constitutional norms by the use of the decree laws» and 
F. Bilancia, Il decreto-legge come strumento di attuazione del diritto UE dell’emergenza finanziaria. 
Riflessioni conclusive, in R. Calvano (ed.), op. cit., 219-236; he illustrated how the decree law 
would be an instrument entrusted to domestic EU law implementation. See, also S. Ragone, La 
incidencia de la crisis en la distribución interna del poder entre parlamentos y gobiernos nacionales, in 
The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the EU Institutions and Member States, Navarra, 2015, 527-
550 for the same trend in Spain.
13 As argued, C. Drigo, op. cit., 2.
14 Especially in judgment no. 70/2012, where the Italian Constitutional court performed a di-
rect audit of the budget of the Campania region, and declared unconstitutional the regional 
law that provided this budget, because it also included funds that were not reliable and not yet 
available in regional funds. See, on this point D. Morgante, La costituzionalizzazione del pareggio 
di bilancio, in Federalismi.it, 2012, 1-39.
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strictly follow the principles of proportionality, or of graduated, appro-
priate measures15.
2.  The «emergency» of new incoming migration flows 
and constitutional guarantees in a time of stress
Italy and the European Union continue to consider the migratory phe-
nomenon as an exceptional moment, to be solved with exceptional tools. 
It is now clear to all scholars who have dealt with this issue that only an 
ordinary regulatory framework can find solutions that can simultaneously 
take into account the security needs of countries that receive the flows – 
especially at a time of particular alert for global terrorism and the protec-
tion of migrants’ rights. Failure to reconcile interests may lead to a breach 
in one of these constitutional principles.
In recent times, a rupture of Constitutional values and principles, 
and violations of Constitutional rights, were avoided mostly due to the 
great and arduous work of the Constitutional Court, which has intervened 
several times to protect the freedoms of non-citizens and the stateless. 
Instead, Parliament has been repeatedly led by demagogic forces and has 
availed oneself of emergency sources for solving what is in fact a struc-
tural matter. In Italy, the recent Decree law no. 13/2017 was converted by 
Parliament into law no. 46/2017 under the pressure of the new migration 
flows arriving in Southern Italy, with the goal of identifying migrants’ 
needs16 in greater detail. The Italian Constitution tolerates no violation of 
civil liberties and personal freedoms, so this law might be declared uncon-
15 Although, the use of this principle is also a problem, because it might overturn the relation-
ship between lawmaker and judge in favour of the latter. The strict proportionality scrutiny stated 
from the outset that the judge also assessed the impact and effects of his judgment, which is 
a predominantly political activity, and suggested replacing the latter with a more reassuring 
rule of the judges. The debate, focusing on the relationship between judge and legislator, now 
strongly skewed towards the judges, is examined by R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins 
and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard, 2007; the querelle about the principle of 
proportionality is deeply examined especially by A. Barak, Proportionality, Cambridge, 2012. In 
Italy, the Constitutional court’s judgments do not apply the principle of strict proportionality 
and therefore that relationship between judges and legislators is balanced, but nevertheless a 
progressive assertion of jurisprudential activity on legislation, due to its absence, is examined 
by O. Chessa, I giudici del diritto. Problemi teorici della giustizia costituzionale, Milano, 2014. For 
the transformation of constitutional law and the relationship between proportionality and the 
doctrine of neo-constitutionalism, see A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism, in 14 Yale law school Faculty Scholarship Series, (2008), 72-164.
16 This is the latest regulatory framework on the subject, which only partially modifies Law 
no. 122/2016 and Legislative Decree no. 203/2016, as well as the corpus of the immigration’s 
legislation embodied in Law no. 189/2002, called the Bossi-Fini Law.
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stitutional because it appears to conflict with the Constitutional guaran-
tees of due process of law: the new rules set up a special process that does 
not include first instance and appeal to reject the Decree of expulsion from 
national territory (art. 17); specific and dedicated tribunals are provided 
for migration affairs (art. 16); the first and only instance does not ensure 
the principle of the adversarial process or the guarantees contained in 
articles 24 and 111 of the Italian Constitution (art. 16)17.
In this case, a generic need for security cannot be considered a fun-
damental principle, nor must it be balanced with personal freedom and 
others fundamental rights. Vigorously reaffirmed is what was already 
stated in several previous judgments, in which Constitutional judges de-
clared unconstitutional some parts of the so-called? Bossi-Fini law18.
In criminal law, too, defendant’s guarantees are being unconsti-
tutionally set aside. One example of this concerns alternative detention 
measures, which are not sufficiently protected for immigrants because 
it is difficult to guarantee home-based detention when residence itself 
is a requirement rarely met by these people – although, theoretically, 
these measures should also be granted to irregular immigrants and those 
without residence permits19. For everybody, it provides the guarantee of 
not being repatriated to the country escaped from and where the person 
would face persecutions; this means that in these cases, expulsion cannot 
be applied as a substitute sanction or alternative measure of detention20. 
Respect for Constitutional rights is at risk when asylum seekers, upon ar-
rival on Italian territory, are deprived of personal freedom because they 
are accompanied to closed centres, and thus into situations of substantial 
detention, without having committed a crime and in the absence of the 
guarantees reserved for prisoners, mostly under inhuman and degrad-
17 The Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional a similar question contained in 
the Bossi-Fini Law for the violation of the principle of adversarial process in judgment no. 
222/2004; see the comment by G. Bascherini, La Corte costituzionale dichiara l’illegittimità cos-
tituzionale di alcune disposizioni della legge Bossi-Fini, in Costituzionalismo.it, 2004.
18 The Constitutional Court intervened several times to defend the rights of migrants as 
human beings: in judgment no. 105/2001, it declared unconstitutional any restriction, for 
anyone, of personal freedom (citizens and non-citizens alike) without respect for jurisdic-
tional guarantees. In judgments no. 222/2004 and no. 223/2004, it intervened because Leg-
islative Decree no. 286/1998 did not respect the limits and guarantees contained in art. 13 
of the Italian Constitution (judgment no. 222) and the principle of the due process of law 
(Judgment n. 223).
19 Judgment no. 299/2010. The Constitutional Court maintained the proper interpretation of 
the Constitution and proposed considering «domicile» to include «housing accommodations» 
at «reception centres», for people without accommodations (judgment no. 61/2011).
20 Art. 16, paragraph 9, Immigration Law.
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ing detention conditions that were censured by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Khlaifia v. Italy21.
The permanent state of fear and the economic crisis make it difficult 
for Parliaments to recognize social rights for immigrants as well, even 
though domestic and European immigration regulations establish that 
social rights could be an instrument of integration; however, above all, 
the principle of equality under article 3 of the Constitution does not allow 
a distinction to be made between needy citizens and needy non-citizens, 
as long as the latter have entered the country legally22. EU legislation fol-
lows the same vein23. In addition, the provision of social benefits also 
involves the Italian Regions24. Therefore, the picture becomes even more 
complicated by the multilevel government, which legitimizes a substantial 
«graduated scale» in the provision of rights and services to non-citizens 
as well25. Some social rights are only granted to foreigners who are long-
21 Khlaifia and others v. Italy, ECHR 2016-16483/12 where Italy was condemned for violation of 
Article 5, paragraph 1 (and consequently of Articles 5, par. 2 and 5, par. 4), on account of a lack of 
legal basis for the deprivation of the applicants’ liberty. Their de facto detention without any formal 
decision had deprived them of the constitutional habeas corpus guarantees afforded to individuals 
held in a removal centre and, even in the context of a migration crisis, this could not be compat-
ible with the aim of Article 5 of the Convention taken together with Article 3, in respect of the 
conditions of detention. See, on this point, E. Rinaldi, L’Unione europea e le deroghe alla libertà di 
circolazione in funzione di governo dei flussi migratori, in Costituzionalismo.it, 3, 2016, 325-354.
22 C. Corsi, Stranieri, diritti sociali e principio di eguaglianza nella giurisprudenza della Corte cos-
tituzionale, in Federalismi.it, 3, 2014, 1-30.
23 F. Biondi Dal Monte, I diritti sociali degli stranieri tra frammentazione e non discriminazione. 
Alcune questioni problematiche, in Le istituzioni del federalismo, 5, 2008, 557-595.
24 Art. 117 Const., paragraph 2 attributes to the State legislative competence for a) asylum and 
legal status of citizens of non-EU states; b) immigration. The Constitutional Court specifies that 
State legislation must be limited to «programming policy of the immigration flow in the national 
territory» (judgment no. 134/2010) and the policy of regularization of irregular foreigners (judg-
ment no. 201/2005). Therefore, the Italian Constitution and immigration legislation does not 
exclude the competence of the Regions, called upon to regulate others aspects of the life of non-
citizens, like health, social assistance and education, which includes all public service facilities 
(judgments no. 156/2006, no. 300/2005, no. 299/2010). Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, referred 
to as the Immigration Law, is the framework with which regions can adopt broader norms in line 
with state prescriptions, except in social welfare, where the regions have full competence (judg-
ment no. 10/2010). Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Immigration Law requires Regions and other 
local authorities to «take the necessary measures to remove obstacles to the full recognition of the 
rights and interests recognized for foreigners in the territory of the State, in particular the right 
to housing, social integration, the study of the Italian language, with respect for the fundamental 
rights of the human being». In practice, this model of sharing competence between the State and 
Regions is not so clear and undisputed; on this point, see C. Corsi, Immigrazione e diritti sociali: 
il nodo irrisolto del riparto di competenza tra Stato e Regioni, in E. Rossi, F. Biondi Dal Monte, M. 
Vrenna (eds.), La governance dell’immigrazione. Diritti, politiche e competenze, Bologna, 2013, 229-
251; L. Ronchetti (ed.), La Repubblica e le migrazioni, Milano, 2014.
25 As stated in art. 41 of the Immigration Law; see C. Salazar, Leggi statali, leggi regionali e 
politiche per gli immigrati: i diritti dei «clandestini» e degli «irregolari» in due recenti decisioni della 
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time residents in the same place, even though the Constitutional Court 
has specified that the residence requirement should not weigh excessively 
on the delivery of services26 and is not to be considered in the case of ap-
plication of the principle of equality to a fundamental right that affects all 
human beings27.
The right to public housing has often been an overestimated require-
ment28. Even if he Constitutional Court has considered it an «inviolable 
human right»29 provided for by article 2 of Italian Constitution30, regional 
law does not extend to illegal aliens access to publicly funding housing, 
because the Immigration Law (art. 40, paragraph 6) provides for such 
measures only for legal aliens31.
Corte costituzionale (Sentenze. n. 134 e 269/2010), in AA.VV., Studi in onore di Franco Modugno, 
Napoli, 2011, IV, 3237-3274.
26 In the field of social assistance and social services, the Constitutional Court has stated 
that social provisions do not tolerate distinctions based either on citizenship or on particular 
types of residence, because any requirement regarding residence or domicile excludes, para-
doxically, precisely the needy and troubled persons that this assistance model aims to ad-
dress in the pursuit of social purposes” (judgment no. 40/2011). In its judgment no. 269/2010, 
the Constitutional Court recognized that Tuscany’s regional law no. 29/2009 (rules on the re-
ception, participatory integration, and protection of foreign nationals in the Tuscany Region) 
stated that extending to non-citizens, even without a valid residence permit, an irreducible 
core of the protection of the right to health protected by the Constitution as an inviolable 
domain of human dignity, is not contrary to the principle and spirit of the Constitution. For 
an analysis of regional policies for foreigners, see P. Carrozza, Diritti degli stranieri e polit-
iche regionali e locali, in C. Panzera, A. Rauti, C. Salazar, A. Spataro (eds.), Metamorfosi della 
cittadinanza e diritti degli stranieri. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Reggio Calabria, 
26-27 marzo 2015, Napoli, 2016, 86 ff. and E. Grosso, Stranieri irregolari e diritto alla salute. 
L’esperienza giurisprudenziale, in R. Balduzzi (ed.), Cittadinanza, Corti, Salute, Padova, 2007, 
157-170.
27 Constitutional Court, judgments no. 10/1993, no. 198/2000, no. 105/2001, no. 252/2001, no. 
222/2004, no. 224/2005, no. 432/2005. Some of these decisions are alongside – and others be-
fore – the constitutional amendments of 2001, when regionalism was strengthened. As regards 
the recognition of fundamental rights for all people in order to protect human dignity, see 
Constitutional Court, judgment no. 148/2008.
28 Constitutional court, Judgment n° 432/2005. For a comprehensive picture of the security and 
social rights of the weakest, see M. Ruotolo, Sicurezza, dignità e lotta alla povertà. Dal «diritto 
alla sicurezza» alla «sicurezza dei diritti», Napoli, 2012, 1-276. On the requirement of a qualified 
residence in order to access regional welfare, see E. Monticelli, La giurisprudenza costituzionale 
italiana in materia di residenza qualificata e accesso al welfare regionale, in Osservatorio AIC, 2, 
2016 and E. Olivito, Il diritto costituzionale all’abitare, Napoli, 2017, esp. 150 ff.
29 The Constitutional Court, in judgement no. 404/1988 declares that all personal and some 
social rights must be recognized for human beings. For a point of view regarding the right to 
housing and its recognition for all human beings with no distinction made between citizens, 
qualified residents and immigrants, including illegal ones, see F. Pallante, Gli stranieri e il diritto 
all’abitazione, in Costituzionalismo.it, 3, 2016, 135-155.
30 Judgment no. 209/2009; Order no. 76 of 2010.
31 Judgment no. 61/2011.
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In the protection of the right to health as well, the difference between 
legal and illegal aliens persists, even though it is a fundamental right that 
should be guaranteed to all. Illegal immigrants are entitled to life-saving 
care alone; other health benefits are solely for legal aliens and citizens. The 
recurring reason for violating rights – including those of immigrants - is al-
ways that of saving economic resources, especially in times of crisis, which 
deprives the regions of their legislative autonomy. It should be a regional 
responsibility to activate the rights to participation in local life32 and the 
question of the social inclusion of foreign citizens33, but these are consid-
ered rights that come at an economic cost and that are not in line with first 
aid. Even when the State wants to set up funds to foster a specific purpose, 
such as implementing foreign education, it cannot do so because regional 
autonomy does not allow the central institution to finance the territories 
for precise purposes34, as these must be chosen by local politicians. Often, 
however, the regions cannot justify to their electorates such courageous 
(and expensive) choices, nor do they have sufficient funds to do so.
The issue of immigration is rather complex and it should be pointed 
out that the legislation and the decisions of Constitutional courts have long 
established a system of a graduated scale of rights for non-citizens; however, 
not only the principle of equality pursuant to art. 3 of the Italian Constitution, 
but also the respect for equal social dignity included in it, excludes this hy-
pothesis35: even in cases of scarce resources, a choice in the matter of redis-
tribution must be reasonable, and discrimination could never be considered 
consistent/compatible with the Supreme Law, as regards either freedoms 
or social rights. In addition, a ceiling of common guarantees is needed in 
order to avoid discrepancies between the different categories of non-citizens, 
which include all foreigners, European citizens, non-EU citizens, those with 
or without residence permits, stateless persons and asylum seekers36. Such 
32 Judgments no. 372 and 379/2004.
33 Judgments no. 300/2005.
34 Judgment no. 50/2008.
35 A. Ciervo, I diritti sociali degli stranieri: un difficile equilibrio tra principio di non discriminazi-
one e pari dignità sociale, in F. Angelini, M. Benvenuti, A. Schillaci (Ed.), Le nuove frontiere del 
diritto dell’immigrazione: integrazione, diritti, sicurezza, Jovene, 2011, 367-388, M. Benvenuti, La 
protezione internazionale degli stranieri tra polarità vecchie e nuove, in F. Angelini, M. Benvenuti 
e A. Schillaci (eds.), Le nuove frontiere del diritto dell’immigrazione: integrazione, diritti, sicurezza, 
Napoli, 2011, 59-92.
36 For the different juridical treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, see T. Guarnier, La cit-
tadinanza e la condizione giuridica degli stranieri nell’ordinamento italiano, in M.P. Paternò (ed.), 
Questioni di confine. Riflessioni sulla convivenza giuridico‐politica in una prospettiva multidisciplin-
are, Napoli, 2014, 131‐156.
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differences cannot affect the guarantees that the Court has rightly based on 
the human person and not on his differentiated legal status.
Even the most recent debate, in which financial issues have become 
a super-constitutional principle37, the spending limit is fixed not only 
through legislation, but by the Constitution as well. Legislators can de-
cide to exclude some categories of people for public benefits, but without 
distinguishing between immigrants and citizens, because the principle of 
equality does not allow for different treatment of equal situations: all the 
needy are in the same condition; a certain differentiation may be assumed 
for those who have no residence permit. Constitutional judges recognized 
and extended most social benefits to immigrants and non-citizens, when 
immigrants needed them or were in situations of social discomfort, and 
if these benefits were closely related to the human being’s needs38. The 
debate becomes more heated when it comes to rights not linked to the 
bare necessities for survival. In several cases, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court also extended benefits to legal non-citizens. In this case, the Con-
stitutional Court won the challenge by managing to maintain the level 
of rights protection without drawing a distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens, taking pains not to give up the guarantees of the rule of law, 
even for immigrants39.
3.  Terrorism, emergency, and suspension  
of Constitutional guarantees
Italy has had a long history of political terrorism. During the 1970s, politi-
cal terrorism emerged and a balance between security and rights already 
saw the attention of lawmakers and the Constitutional Court. The govern-
ment adopted some Legislative Decrees (59/78 and 625/1979) establishing 
37 I. Ciolli, The balanced budget rule in the Italian Constitution: it ain’t necessarily so… useful?, in 
Rivista AIC, 4, 2014, 1-21.
38 The Constitutional Court extended benefits to non-citizens (but with a regular residence 
permit) when unable to work (judgments no. 11/2009, 187/2010, 22/2015, 230/2015) and re-
quiring assistance by means of economic resources (306/2008, 329/2011, 40/2013). Such aid 
may not, moreover, be subject to the condition of long-term residence (judgement no. 2/2013). 
See M. Cartabia M., Gli «immigrati» nella giurisprudenza costituzionale: titolari di diritti e protago-
nisti della solidarietà, in C. Panzera, A. Rauti, C. Salazar, A. Spataro (eds.), Quattro lezioni sugli 
stranieri, Napoli, 2016, 3-21.
39 For example, free access to regional transport for the disabled, although a benefit that could 
not be included in the essential levels of assistance, is extended to all people in this condi-
tion, without considering the citizenship requirement (Constitutional Court, judgment no. 
432/2005).
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new and vague offences, with lesser guarantees both in police custody and 
in body or home searches, as well as in interception. The Government 
adopted the emergency measures, which were ratified by Parliament 
without hesitation (Laws no. 191/78 and no. 15/80). The Constitutional 
Court was called upon to control the constitutionality of the question of 
the maximum length of detention ante judicium for some terrorists, and its 
judges ruled that the Constitution had not been violated because it was 
an emergency situation that demanded emergency tools40. They strongly 
underlined that
if it is to be admitted that a general situation in which terrorism is 
causing death leads to a state of emergency, it must be agreed that 
the emergency, in its most specific sense, is certainly an abnormal 
and serious condition, but also by essence temporary. Consequently, 
it legitimizes unusual measures, but these would lose any legitimacy 
if they were unjustifiably protracted over time41.
This condition of temporariness is not included in the recent emergency 
condition that has become a permanent condition42. Nevertheless, many 
measures of limitation of personal freedom were also considered to be in 
line with the Constitution by anti-terrorism laws after 9/11, although they 
are not limited in time. This is their first and most obvious infringement 
upon the Constitution43.
However, the phenomenon of international terrorism that began 
with the attack on the World Trade Center is another matter, and demands 
new tools and new strategies that are relevant to a globalized and interac-
tive world. Furthermore, terrorism and emergency in migration flows are 
often seen as only a matter of public order requiring exceptional measures, 
despite being long-term conditions and therefore not limited in time and 
space, which are the requirements distinguishing emergency sources44. 
40 They reaffirmed that the principle of the inviolability of personal freedom is the rule and 
limitation an exception.
41 Judgment no. 15/1982, point 7.
42 I. Ciolli, The Constitutional Consequences of Financial Crisis and the Use of Emergency Powers: 
Flexibility and Emergency Sources, cit., 6.
43 T. Groppi, «Business as usual». Le dialogue judiciaire sur les affaires antiterroristes après le 11 
septembre 2001, in J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, O. Diggelman, H. Bauer (Eds.), Etat de droit, Sécurité 
et Liberté en Europe, Athènes, Bruxlles, Baden Baden, 2010, 325 ff.
44 For an idea of the «ordinary emergency», see T. Groppi, «Business as usual », cit., 8, and G. 
De Minico, Costituzione, emergenza e terrorismo, Napoli, 2016, 7, see also C. Tripodina, Lotta al 
terrorismo e tutela dei diritti fondamentali, Torino, 2009.
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Terrorism laws and judicial remedies are always so homogenous because 
the tools are similar: the government exercises the legislative emergency 
power; the principle of legality is respected only formally, because Parlia-
ment simply ratifies the government decisiveness. It is not just a tyranny of 
the majority as many authors have argued, but a tyranny that the ordinary 
legislator exercises over the founding fathers and the rule of law: even for 
strong Constitutions, Parliaments modify the rules that represent the heart 
of constitutions, such as their fundamental principles, thus shattering the 
deeper meaning of the Constitutional pact with no limitation in time – and 
therefore, in theory, permanently. The core of the content is considering the 
security as a «right» that must be balance with others fundamental ones. 
In this interpretation security could be considered an obligation of facere 
for the national States, that can compress other fundamental rights. This is 
the main interpretation in this last period and it products also less politics 
of inclusions of diversity. In a social constitutional State on of the priority 
consists in the defence and the guarantee of the constitutional intents that 
only partly consist on security or emergency questions45.
The legislative measures against terrorism are not so different in 
different Countries: everywhere, they consist of placing limitations on 
court guarantees and on the right to privacy, and of preventive deten-
tion, including of terrorist suspects, foreign terrorists and those sus-
pected of terrorism, with no special procedural guarantees, and with 
easier searches.
Scholars’ reactions differ: some authors have tried to defend the hard 
core of freedoms46 while others believe that the suspension of some fun-
damental rights, outside Constitutional provisions, is natural, and that 
special emergency powers have to be provided for; it is merely because 
emergencies cannot be anticipated47. And if in Italy, in 2006, Paolo Bonetti 
45 See M. Ruotolo, Costituzione e sicurezza tra diritto e società, in A. Torre (ed.), Costituzioni e 
sicurezza dello Stato, Rimini, 2013, 587-588 and M. Dogliani, Il volto costituzionale della sicurezza, 
in G. Cocco (ed.), I diversi volti della sicurezza, Milano, 2012, 6-10.
46 B. Ackermann, The Emergency Constitution, cit., 1029-1091, at 1030 had guessed, as early as 
the attack on the Twin Towers, that democracy was at stake because the emergency powers that 
tried to steer the crisis suspended too many liberties and guarantees.
47 But G. De Minico, Le libertà fondamentali in tempo di ordinario terrorismo, in Federalismi.it, 10, 
2015, 1 raises the most burning issue as to what are the limits of the compression of funda-
mental freedoms to ensure preventive control of the terrorism phenomenon. When speaking 
of prevention, the extent of gravity can only be assumed; so much depends on the state of 
alert that is created and the state of fear that is generated in public opinion. O. Gross, The 
Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the «Norm-
Exception» Dichotomy, in 21 Cardozo Law Review, 1999-2000, 1825-1868 speaks of a dichotomy 
between norm and exception, which cannot be overcome with a constitutional legal provision 
The new challenges of constitutional Courts
581
believed that the Italian system, like other democratic systems, allows 
derogations from the Constitution only during a state of war, but provides 
for ordinary instruments to safeguard security needs without sacrificing 
the protection of liberties48, Giovanna De Minico49, in 2015, when the 
special emergency legislation had already yielded its effects, raised the 
most burning issue, asking what were the limits on the compression of 
fundamental freedoms to ensure preventive control of the terrorism phe-
nomenon. In other words, today’s terrorism prevention policies call for 
renouncing the protection of our rights to be safeguarded against a «fu-
ture and uncertain» threat that we cannot quantify50. Among the Consti-
tutional changes that this involves is a new way of understanding balance, 
which necessarily becomes uneven. In the most recent period of terrorism 
or of economic crisis, political decisions or constitutional controls have 
often been adopted by evaluating in an unequal way the principles, values 
and rights contained in the Constitution. The principle of proportionality 
has become the central tool of Constitutional affairs. When considering 
the generic protection of «future generations» that is always taken into 
account in balancing social costs, the phenomenon becomes clearer. We 
attempt to protect a category of subjects to whom to transfer a protection 
of state of exception: the response to emergency could be undemocratic. O. Gross, Chaos and 
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, in 112 The Yale Law Journal, 
(2002-2003), at 1021-1026, and at 1058-1081, after the attack on the Twin Towers, explains that: 
«the Business as usual model is based on notions of constitutional absolutism and perfection. 
According to this model, ordinary legal rules and norms continue to follow strictly with no 
substantive change even in times of emergency and crisis. Other models of emergency power 
may be grouped together under the general category of “model of disaccommodation” insofar 
as they attempt to accommodate, within the existing normative structure, intact as much as 
possible, some exceptional adjustments introduced to accommodate exigency. […] I suggest 
that these traditional models may not always to be adequate: both as a matter of theory and 
practice». Gross criticizes this model because it is naive and hypocritical in the sense that it 
disregards the reality of governmental exercise of emergency that is hidden by the ordinary sys-
tem, and especially because this model is likely to make the emergency permanent. L.H. Tribe, 
P.O. Gudridge, The Antiemergency Constitution, in 113 The Yale Law Journal, 2004, 1801-1870at 
1803 are also critical of Ackerman’s thought and they consider his scheme with «the vaguest 
contours». The emergency clauses seem to be «improvised» and conferred an «unspecified in-
stitutions and at unspecified times». For a recent point of view of United States idea of security 
and about the Supreme constitutional court positions see A. Di Martino, Political branches, Corte 
suprema e corti di Common law nei casi su Guantanamo, in A. Torre (ed.), op. cit., 762-808, at 784 ff.
See, also, T. Groppi, Business as usual, cit., 325 ff. dedicate to the role of judges and especially of 
the constitutional court in the defence of the rights and freedom in a time of terrorism emergency.
48 P. Bonetti, Terrorismo, emergenza e Costituzioni democratiche, Bologna, 2006, as recalled by Leg-
islative Decree no. 144/2005 (converted into law no. 15/2005), which extended the anti-Mafia 
law to the fight against terrorism, and also includes some measures concerning the juridical 
condition of foreigners.
49 G. De Minico, Le libertà fondamentali, cit., 1.
50 Ivi, 4
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we do not know will be commensurate with future times and needs; we 
renounce protecting some (social) rights for today, betting on a better 
future51. The same can be said with regard to the precautionary princi-
ple, which arises in international law (hence with more flexible and non-
national rules) and then in European law with the Maastricht Treaty, in 
particular to defend people against unknown dangers concerning the 
protection of the environment, and which has expanded until the legisla-
tive power and the court’s decisions are increasingly discretionary and 
are spreading unequal balance52. Reflection, principles of proportionality 
and precaution exist alongside another limit that traditionally has to be 
balanced with rights of liberty in exceptional situations: public order. The 
proliferation of ancient and modern limits makes the exercise of rights 
more difficult. In this context, it is easy to contain freedom to speech or 
privacy and mobile communication interceptions before a threat of ter-
rorism53.
As for Italian anti-terrorism measures, Legislative Decree no. 7/2015 
was adopted and converted into law no. 43/2015. It takes into consid-
eration the new figure of the international terrorist and of terrorism; a 
general de-territorialisation of the structure of these organizations; and 
the purpose of this new form of terrorism designed to undermine the 
founding values of democracies. The transformation of these new terror 
organizations is noticeable: These are structures based on flexible, light 
and horizontal associations, sometimes composed of few members, or 
even only of only a single member, and their attacks on innocent victims 
are entirely unpredictable, committed for the sole purpose of spreading 
terror in the population. Therefore, the State’s response is also special – 
some speak of an «emergency criminal law»54: As in other legal systems, 
it punishes the intent, that is, it anticipates the punishment for a crime 
yet to be committed, and there is a vagueness and uncertainty in the of-
51 M. Luciani, Generazioni future, distribuzione temporale della spesa pubblica e vincoli costituzi-
onali, R. Bifulco, A. D’Aloia (Eds.), Un diritto per il futuro. Teorie e modelli dello sviluppo sostenibile 
e della responsabilità intergenerazionale, Napoli, 2008, 425 ff., who refuses this idea of a juridical 
category of future generation, because it refers to an abstract person that has not yet existed, 
and cannot be a holder of rights.
52 A global vision of this phenomenon, and in particular an accurate examination of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, is contained in C.R. Sulstein, Laws of Fear Beyond the Precautionary Princi-
ple, Cambridge, 2005 C.R. Sulstein, Laws of Fear Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, 
2005, 109-174.
53 F. Fabbrini, V.C. Jackson (eds.), Constitutionalism Across the Borders in the Struggle Against 
Terrorism, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2016, especially 1-14.
54 See R. Bartoli, Legislazione e prassi in tema di contrasto al terrorismo internazionale: un nuovo 
paradigma emergenziale?, in Diritto penale contemporaneo, 2017, 4.
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fense55. «Training for activities with purpose of international terrorism» 
(Article 270 quinquies of the Italian criminal code) that is, preparatory acts: 
the law would thus punish the intent and not the act, thus distorting the 
sense of criminal law.
In this complex landscape, not only national but also European law 
has led to the emergence of exceptions from and breaks in the rules set 
out in the Treaties56.
4.  The economic crisis: the hardest challenge  
to constitutional rules
As Balaguer57 argues, the economic crisis has literally overturned domestic 
constitutional principles from a number of different standpoints: the cri-
sis changes the way to interpret the economic Constitution; it introduces 
permanent emergency powers that for constitutionalists represent an oxy-
moron, a contradiction in terms, because emergencies ought be limited in 
time; it imposes a different relationship between Government and Parlia-
ment, that is not caused by the crisis but has become more evident with it; 
it has transformed the constitutionally enshrined division of competence 
55 R. Wenin, Una riflessione comparata sulle norme in materia di addestramento per finalità di ter-
rorismo, Comparative Law Observations on the Rules and Regulations Concerning Terrorism Training, 
in Diritto penale contemporaneo, 4, 2016, 108 and 117 argues on «international policies regarding 
the issue of training for the purpose of terrorism. This study provides an opportunity to reflect 
upon the strains faced by “classic” criminal law against the desired anticipation of punish-
ability for purely premonitory conduct, in which the risk of taking on excessive consequences 
as opposed to actual intent arises. The severity of the threat has prompted the legislature to 
increasingly anticipate punishments with the risk of affecting socially neutral conduct and the 
consequential loss of the selective capability of the criminal law.»
56 I am referring here to the «new Schengen rules» contained in particular in Regulation no. 
399/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 «on a Union Code 
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)»; 
on their conflict with the goal of freedom of movement, see E. Rinaldi, L’Unione europea e le 
deroghe alla libertà di circolazione in funzione di governo dei flussi migratori, cit., 336 ff.
57 F. Balaguer Callejón, Una interpretación constitucional de la crisis económica, in 19 Revista de 
Derecho Constitucional Europeo, 2013, 449-450 explains «En primer lugar, esa interpretación 
económica no se limita a insertar en la Constitución la vertiente económica del orden social, 
sino que pretende, por el contrario, vertebrar todo el orden social y la propia Constitución 
desde esa vertiente económica, de tal manera que aspira a una concepción global del en-
tero sistema constitucional a partir de la economía. En esto contrasta con la idea de Con-
stitución económica, que se configuraba como una parte de la Constitución que ordenaba la 
realidad económica, pero no el entero sistema constitucional, y que era compatible con la idea 
de democracia como un proceso de articulación de intereses plurales de la sociedad». For an 
interpretation of the crisis as a new model of constitutionalism see also A. Cantaro, Crisi cos-
tituzionale europea e diritto della crisi, in F. Del Vecchio, B. Andò (eds.), Costituzione, globalizzazione 
e tradizione giuridica europea, Padova, 2012, 353-371.
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between the State and the Regions, leading to a new centralization in the 
State58.
The introduction of the budget rule into the Italian Constitution 
overturned the placement of the economic Constitution in the constitu-
tional principle. Constitutional amendment no. 1/2012, modifying arti-
cle 81, introduced strong new relationships within the Constitution; the 
original intent of the Constitution’s founding fathers was to guarantee 
a social State through a political mediation of different interests; while 
they regulate economic freedoms, they found contemplation and limits 
in social purposes, in social functions and human dignity, or other inter-
ests as well (articles 41, 42, 43). The introduction of the new article 81 to 
the Constitution placed rights and expenditure on the same rank as the 
Social state. The inevitable consequence of these equal recognitions in the 
Constitution of rights and costs introduces an indirect and hidden idea 
that rights can be limited or balanced with costs even when that right is 
constitutionally protected and therefore its enforcement is binding it.
Containing public expenditure became the beacon and guide for 
the Constitutional court, Parliament, and Government in its regulatory 
power; the Constitutional Court has even disregarded the principle of the 
retroactive effect of its decisions on containing costs59.
The relationship between Parliament and Government has been 
transformed over these past years. This is not caused by the crisis, but 
has put the predominance of the executive into relief and legitimizes this 
anomaly. During the crisis, the fundamental reforms are regulated by De-
cree Law and by Legislative Decree, and Parliament intervened only to 
rouse the delegation, or at the end of the legislative process to convert the 
decrees into law. Parliamentary debates are almost absent, because the 
Government intervenes during the conversion with a vote of confidence 
58 For this recent constitutional process see T. Groppi, I. Spigno, N. Vizioli, The Constitutional 
Consequences of the Financial Crisis in Italy, in X. Contiades (ed.), Constitutions in the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis. A Comparative Analysis, London, 2013, 102, and S. Ragone, Constitutional effects 
of the financial crisis at european and national level a comparative overview, in Revista general de 
derecho público comparado, 15, 2014, 1-23; as regards the impact of the insertion of this amend-
ment in the Italian Constitution, see T. Groppi, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Italian 
Written Constitution, in Italian Journal of Public Law, 2, 2012, 1-14.
59 As C. Bergonzini, The Italian Constitutional Court and Balancing the Budget, in European Consti-
tutional Law Review, 12, 2016, 181 stated, this judgement «represents the Court’s first attempt to 
limit the retroactive effects of a ruling of unconstitutionality to protect budgetary equilibrium»; 
in fact, Constitutional court declares unconstitutional the rule containing the Robin Tax for oil 
companies and the consequence of the retroactive effects of the Court’s decisions should have 
been to refund the tax, for past years as well. This would have represented a serious budgetary 
problem, so the Court provided only for a future refund. This, however, is a breach of the Italian 
constitutional model as regards seeking redress at the Constitutional Court.
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on its text, which prevents any discussion or amendments by the As-
sembly. Furthermore, the crisis quickly imposes decisions and assembly 
generally tends towards reflexive decision-making, while the government 
guarantees strict times.
Concerning the Constitutional Court’s position with regard to the most 
recent crisis, in my view it swings from strict compliance with constitutional 
regimes even when recognizing the existence of an economic emergency, to 
a reversal of the rules, as in the case of judgment no. 10/2015. Also relevant 
is its general «judical policy», which consisted of taking the crisis into con-
sideration but without creating its own personal position, its own doctrine 
of the crisis60. But it is undeniable that many of its decisions were oriented, 
during those periods, towards prioritizing lower public spending among 
the interests involved but without renouncing its confirmation of guaran-
tees on social rights or other constitutional rights and powers (for example, 
concerning State-Regions relations). The first result is a sort of concurrence 
with the role of the Parliament in choosing the best interest of stakehold-
ers61. For these reasons, its decisions swing from an absolute prevalence of 
the principle of equality on budget rules, to a mere minimum (and formal) 
content of the right to housing in order to contain public expenditures in a 
time of crisis62. Clearly, there are more differences, and the constitutional 
judges must follow such principles as proportionality and reasonableness, 
but these are the open clauses that provide for a certain amount of discre-
tion as judgment no. 10/2015 shows or, to the contrary, could be used to 
defend the social right to an adequate wage (article 36 Const.) and an ad-
equate retirement pension (art. 38) as judgment no. 70 pointed out.
Sometimes, the Constitutional Court seems to adhere to the theory 
of a graduated access to the rights and conditioned rights, which are based 
in the German theory of Vorbehalt des Möglichen. This occurs when it de-
clares that in periods of scarce resources, only the core of rights that cost 
money could be protected63. This could affect the prescriptive nature of 
constitutional rights, which would be conditioned by available resources 
and thus deferred in their implementation.
60 M. Benvenuti, Brevi considerazioni intorno al ricorso all’argomento della crisi economica nella più 
recente giurisprudenza costituzionale, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 2, 2013, 969-979.
61 Ibidem.
62 Judgment no. 121/2010, where the right to housing is considered to be satisfied not by ob-
taining housing but by being included on waiting lists until public resources are available for 
the purpose.
63 As in judgment no. 316/2010, when the Supreme Court judges did not apply the principle 
of pegging public wages to the cost of living as the Constitution prescribes, basically to speed 
its return.
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Globalization and the complexity of the juridical world require a 
multilevel government, which is regionalism, but in this last decade, 
the Constitutional Court has preferred to legitimate a re-centralization 
of the legislative competence in the State, even when the Constitution 
entrusts concurrent competence shared between State and Regions, or 
in rare cases re-centralization removes competences conferred by the 
Constitution to the regions alone64. The constitutional judges, through 
the use of such technical tools as the «clause of the prevalence» of State 
competence, or the «coordination of public finance, are tending inexora-
bly towards a new and solid return to the central State for implementing 
an economy of scale where the State can better control the use of the 
public resources».
The challenge to maintain the territorial set-up imposed by the 2001 
constitutional reform appears to be lost.
5. Final considerations
The changes and events impacting constitutional law and its institu-
tions are now global in scope – the responses to them, at least as regards 
Western democracies, are quite homogeneous. In particular, all of Europe 
has suffered from and continues to grapple with what is now a cyclical 
economic and financial crisis – a crisis that has imposed prompt and ex-
ceptional measures aimed at filling the gaps and following the markets’ 
trends, both in European Union law and in the Member States.
This «exceptionality» and «promptness» are two new and chal-
lenging developments that Constitutions have to face when entering the 
global world. The challenge for Constitutional Courts is insidious and 
unnatural: they were born to govern, with certain and predictable rules, 
moments that are at times exceptional65: the relationship with continuous 
exceptionality and emergency shines the spotlight on their inadequacy. 
Moreover, there is also a continuous and palpable tension between Con-
stitutions – which are designed to last, theoretically, for all eternity so as 
to be immortal and in force indefinitely – and the precarious nature of the 
fast time frames and contracts now demanded of state institutions in order 
to regulate increasingly fleeting and fluid current phenomena.
64 Judgments no. 10/2010 and no. 62/2013.
65 I am referring to Articles 77 and 78 of the Italian Constitution.
The new challenges of constitutional Courts
587
The time factor has made its impact by demanding faster and faster 
decisions, aimed at circumventing complex ones – decisions that require 
more time for debate and approval than those adopted by a single person, 
or by the Government. This is the reason for the increasingly frequent 
recourse to urgent legislations – not so much, or not only, because the 
decision is taken without having to bargain with parliamentary minorities, 
but also because it proves faster and more prepared to follow the markets’ 
own timing, and to reassure markets in order to keep them from consider-
ing the States as unreliable. But in this way, Constitutions are navigating 
by «dead reckoning», losing their ability to guide events, and to plan and 
foresee behaviour. It does not need to be mentioned that this also impacts 
the arrangements of the form of government, and the relationship be-
tween constitutional bodies: the relationship that exists between the Gov-
ernment and Parliament is increasingly skewed towards the former, and 
the role of the latter is becoming that of «ratifying» the political choices 
imposed by the majority. But within the Government, too, relationships 
are changing: there is no more time for bargaining within the Council 
of Ministers; the “presidentialization of the executives is a phenomenon 
impacting Italy and other democracies. I am thinking of the personal and 
not strictly party-linked rise of France’s President Macron; but I am also 
thinking of the Italian executive, where collegiality was sacrificed in the 
name of a more marked leadership by the Prime Minister.
The speed also brought its effects on the rules of constitutional 
amendment: the norm that introduced the balanced budget into the Ital-
ian Constitution66 was approved in accordance with the times imposed 
by art. 138 of the Constitution (a three-month interval between the first 
and second vote on the revision law), but under duress, with some incon-
venience and without waiting one day more than required. The Constitu-
tion was thus respected in form but not in substance: the parliamentary 
debate needed for constitutional review was lacking; public opinion was 
not involved; and the very meaning of the review as an opportunity for 
reflection was therefore overturned.
On the other hand, the rules to contain the deficit and the public 
debt were adopted in a regime of emergency that was imposed upon the 
normal juridical rules of both the Union and of its Member States. This 
has meant that the relationship between the law and the economy was 
overturned: it is no longer the Constitutions that dictate the rules – within 
the framework of their own principles and values – within which the eco-
66 Constitutional law no. 1/2012.
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nomic Constitution can function, but it is the latter, as a part now detached 
from everything the constitutional pact is, that is the model within which 
rights must be played out, and in light of which constitutional principles 
must be interpreted. The social state, which has for some time undergone 
the attacks of the doctrine closest to ordoliberalism, was given greater 
vigour by the crisis. Although representing the true new development and 
the very essence of the post-War constitutions, in recent years it has been 
seen as an expensive accessory, and has been strongly conditioned by the 
central importance of controlling spending67. The Italian Constitutional 
Court, after the entry into force of Constitutional Law no. 1/2012 which 
introduced the balanced budget into the Constitution, yielded oscillating 
decisions, often protecting social rights but on one occasion in such a way 
as to transfigure the very system of seeking redress in court, in decision 
no. 10 of 201568. But it cannot be said to have renounced the rights of the 
weakest; in fact, in this field, it attempted to interpret national legislation 
favourably to them, without distinguishing among the needy parties to 
be given benefits, whether they were immigrants or citizens in conditions 
of economic and social precariousness69. However, after decision no. 10, 
some perplexities with regard to striking a balance between rights and 
the need to contain expenses had appeared on the horizon. Part of the 
doctrine deemed that it could represent the first step for a subsequent 
restriction of rights, especially of all those demanding a benefit from the 
67 F. Losurdo, Lo Stato sociale condizionato. Stabilità e crescita nell’ordinamento costituzionale, Gi-
appichelli, 2016, 155 ff., illustrated the transformations, including profound ones, of European 
and national rules in the matter of the social state, casting light on how the rules on balanc-
ing the budget, from the fiscal compact to Italian constitutional review, have literally bent the 
fundamental norms of the EU treaties and of the Italian Constitution.
68 Even though the Court itself appears to explain that it takes so innovative a decision in the 
matter of complying with art. 81 Const. precisely because the balancing is not between a social 
right and the needs for containing expenditure contained in art. 81 Const. In fact, the deci-
sion – by preventing a considerable outlay by the State – makes it indirectly possible to use, 
at a moment of profound economic crisis, the sum saved for public interventions, and even 
those social in nature: in point 8 of the «Considered in law» clause, the Court maintains that 
the overall consequences of the decision’s retroactive effect would end up requiring, in a period 
of persisting economic and financial crisis weighing upon the weaker segments of society, an 
unreasonable distribution of wealth in favour of those economic operators that may instead 
have benefited from a favourable economic trend. This would thus irremediably prejudice the 
requirements of social solidarity, gravely violating articles 2 and 3 Const.
69 Most recently, order no. 95/2017 in the matter of also granting maternity benefits to women 
applying for asylum and holding a humanitarian residence permit but not a long-term resi-
dence permit, in which the Court declared the question inadmissible because the judge a quo 
could have recognized that right on the strength of art. 34, paragraph 5, of Legislative Decree 
no. 251/2007. For the most recent constitutional court approach of social rights see M. Massa, 
Discrezionalità, sostenibilità, responsabilità nella giurisprudenza costituzionale sui diritti sociali, in 
Quaderni costituzionali, 2017, 73-93.
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state so that these rights might be effectively enjoyed. However, subse-
quent decisions showed the Court’s ability to adjust its aim and to dem-
onstrate that the Constitution held firm when it came to protecting rights. 
Therefore, more than a overruling, subsequent decisions clarified how art. 
81 can impact the Constitution, but without excessively restricting rights, 
and without affecting their essential nucleus. Clearly, it is for lawmakers 
and the Court itself to quantify and assess how much protection may be 
included in the essential nucleus. Certainly, not even budget requirements 
can legitimate a violation of articles 36 and 38 of the Constitution, which 
regard the right to fair pay and a fair pension. Similarly, it held as uncon-
stitutional the freeze, repeated over time and now almost permanent, of 
wages for workers in the public sector, and not even the constitutional 
principle of balancing the budget inserted into art. 81 Const. could legiti-
mate this right.
In other words, the Court found that constitutionally guaranteed 
rights should continue to be so, that every restriction must always be in 
proportion to the end to be achieved, and, above all, that every restric-
tion of rights must be limited in time, thereby re-establishing the concept 
of temporariness in emergency regulatory measures. This concept was 
stressed by the constitutional judges in decision no. 275 of 2016, in which, 
even where there are particular and serious spending requirements, the 
rights of the weakest, in this case the disabled’s right to education, must at 
any rate be protected, in spite of the strict budgetary limits imposed by the 
Region. The Court holds that it must be politics to choose how to employ 
resources, but in compliance with the Constitution and with protection 
of rights70.
It is however with respect to the Italian regionalism that the crisis 
deployed all its (bad) influence: Italy’s decentralized system was put to 
a difficult test by the economic crisis, since in times of scarce resources, 
a centralization within the state of both political decisions and of spend-
ing is classically proposed. In this case, the same constitutional norms 
on sharing jurisdiction were bent by lawmakers due to the crisis’s ex-
ceptional nature, and this was endorsed by the Constitutional Court 
which, for example, «rewrote» the financial rules governing the delicate 
relationships between the State and the Regions, by «inventing», in the 
matter of coordinating public finances, an exclusive state jurisdiction not 
present in the Constitution. It recognized the exceptional nature of the 
70 It is in this decision that the Court states «It is the guarantee of non-restrictable rights that 
impacts the budget, and not its balancing that conditions its necessary distribution».
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situation, and even admitted that some competences could be modified 
to combat the crisis and guarantee protection to the weakest parties71; it 
similarly found that the special Regions, too, albeit not in deficit condi-
tions, should also reduce healthcare benefits if they were not deemed 
strictly necessary72; continuing to remain with the theme of containing 
public spending in compliance with art. 81 Const., it also found that the 
Regions in deficit could not guarantee care, even if directed towards 
citizens with serious pathologies, that was not considered essential in 
the Court’s assessment73.
On a number of occasions, the Court used the issue of the economic 
crisis, mentioning it as if it were an element that could actually modify 
constitutional norms by the very fact of its existence. That is, it has been 
taken for granted that it could modify the spirit of the Constitution and 
could in some way condition it. The question takes on all its importance 
when we consider that one of our country’s points of pride is that of not 
having turned our back on the Constitution, even to overcome the bloodi-
est terrorism of the 1970s.
It is precisely in the matter of terrorism that the challenge to the 
guarantees offered by rigid Constitutions is most insidious: the need to 
prevent a centralization of powers and to ensure, in every situation, the 
constitutional guarantees of the rights of freedom, was put to a hard test 
by the legislation adopted after the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
above all after the recent acts of terrorism affecting every part of the world. 
Western democracies have reacted with emergency legislation and with 
the use of such instruments as wiretapping that have limited their citizens’ 
private lives. As always takes place, the phenomena were intertwined, 
and thus the economic crisis, along with intense flows of migration and 
with international terrorism, has produced an age-old phenomenon – the 
fear of others74 – and a new phenomenon: attempting to «prevent» these 
71 In judgement no. 10/2010, the Court dealt with the «social card» – a card allowing the poor 
to purchase food. It found that for reasons of extraordinary need and urgency, although the 
assignment of the social card was included among the matters under the region’s purview, it 
could be considered, on an entirely exceptional basis, a state matter for the purpose of main-
taining the law and guaranteeing, through this instrument, a protection of the primary right 
to access food.
72 Constitutional Court, judgement no. 115 of 2012, with comment by N. Lupo, G. Rivosecchi, 
Quando l’equilibrio di bilancio prevale sulle politiche sanitarie regionali, in Regioni, 2012, 1062 ff.
73 Constitutional Court, judgement no. 192 of 2012 where the Court says that «The principle 
of prior coverage of the expenditure in the legislative setting, provided for by art. 81 Const., is 
imperative».
74 F. Bilancia, F.M. Di Sciullo, F. Rimoli, Paura dell’Altro. Identità occidentale e cittadinanza, Roma, 
2008.
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ills, to conceive a principle of precaution to be applied to social facts and 
not merely to those involving health and the environment. The distinc-
tive juridical element to be grappled with is the limitation of historically 
established rights, such as for example the secrecy of communications, in 
favour of a «possible» terror attack; therefore, «certain» historical guar-
antees of the rights of freedom are renounced in exchange for an «un-
certain» greater security. In the name of this uncertain protection, the 
consequences of a rapid process are accepted, without such jurisdictional 
guarantees as the right to appeal or respect for the principle of the adver-
sarial system, thus losing sight of the fact that that the proper function of 
the trial process is a guarantee not only for the individual accused, but for 
society as a whole when speaking of democratic societies. The same con-
siderations apply for the challenge the immigration phenomenon poses 
for Western democracies. No extraordinary exodus will ever be able to 
legitimate degrading conditions for persons fleeing famine, war, and per-
secution; on this point, the European Court of Human Rights, national 
lawmakers, and the Constitutional Court itself have thus far taken action 
to remedy situations of greatest violation of such universally recognized 
rights as respect for human dignity and for personal freedoms. More dif-
ficult, and entirely within the State, is the protection of social rights, for 
which the Italian Parliament has provided for a graduated scale of pro-
tections, in accordance with the legal condition of the foreign national 
residing or spending time in our territory. The Constitutional Court has 
attempted to extend the social guarantees whenever it was called to pro-
tect the weakest parties, but in this case the real solution might also lie in a 
simpler granting of citizenship, first and foremost to those resident aliens 
now belonging to the second generation, born in Italy, who are citizens 
de facto but not under Italian law.
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